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SAME-PARTY LEGISLATIVE APPOINTMENTS




For half of the states and almost every territory in the United States, legisla-
tive vacancies are filled by some system of temporary appointments rather
than by special elections. Most of these systems utilize “same-party” appoint-
ments to ensure continuity of representation. But few states have anticipated
the problem of state legislators switching parties. Though party-switching is
rare, it happens frequently enough that several state supreme courts have al-
ready interpreted same-party appointment statutes as applied to party-
switchers.
This Article argues for a uniform approach to the problem of party-switch-
ers in same-party appointment systems. First, this Article reviews the current
legislative appointment schemes as they operate today and analyzes each stat-
ute or constitutional provision to determine how each of them might treat a
vacancy caused by a party-switching state legislator, as well as the four state
supreme court decisions addressing this question of statutory interpretation. It
then argues that the principles underlying same-party appointment systems
support statutory amendments to clarify how party-switching state legislators
are replaced.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“I grant you, that non-representation is an evil; but it is not
so great an evil as misrepresentation.”
–Congressman Daniel W. Gooch, delegate to the
1853 Massachusetts Constitutional Convention1
The 2014 midterm election didn’t go well for Democrats across the
country: the party lost ground in the House, sinking to its lowest level
since 1928;2 lost control of the Senate by a wide margin;3 and lost even
further ground in gubernatorial elections.4 The results were equally
bad at the state level, especially in ancestrally Democratic states like
Arkansas, Kentucky, and West Virginia—it appeared on election
night that Democrats had lost ground in all three state legislatures,
shrinking to a smaller minority in Arkansas,5 barely holding onto the
Kentucky Senate,6 and losing the West Virginia House outright.7 At
first, it appeared that the Republicans had barely missed an outright
1. 3 1853 Mass. Const. Convention, Official Report of the Debates and Proceed-
ings in the State Convention, Assembled May 4th 1853, to Revise and Amend the
Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, at 107 (Boston, White & Potter
1853) (remarks of Delegate Daniel W. Gooch).
2. Josh Zeitz, What Happened the Last Time Republicans Had a Majority This
Huge? They Lost It, POLITICO (Nov. 15, 2014), https://www.politico.com/magazine/
story/2014/11/1928-congress-last-time-republicans-had-a-majority-this-huge-112913
[http://perma.cc/6MV2-4Y3M].
3. Jonathan Weisman & Ashley Parker, Riding Wave of Discontent, G.O.P.
Takes Senate, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2014).
4. Reid Wilson, Republican Sweep Extends to State Level, WASH. POST (Nov. 5,
2014, 8:30 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/11/05/repub
lican-sweep-level/ [https://perma.cc/8C6M-45E8].
5. Kyle Trygstad, The First Test of GOP Dominance in Arkansas, ROLL CALL
(Feb. 2, 2015, 5:00 AM), https://www.rollcall.com/2015/02/02/the-first-test-of-gop-
dominance-in-arkansas-2/ [https://perma.cc/YKS5-6PEU].




7. Dave Mistich & Ashton Marra, Five Ways the West Virginia GOP Made His-
tory in the 2014 Election, W. VA. PUB. BROAD. (Nov. 5, 2014), https://www.wvpub
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majority in the West Virginia Senate, which was split 17–17.8 This
would’ve resulted in an uncommon power-sharing agreement between
the Senate Democrats and Republicans, which last happened after the
1910 and 1912 elections.9
But the news got worse from there. The next day, State Senator
Daniel Hall, a Democrat who had served in the Senate for just two
years, announced that he was switching parties, which gave the
Republicans a narrow 18–16 majority.10 This gave West Virginia
Republicans control over the State Legislature for the first time in
nearly a century.11 And because the West Virginia Constitution only
requires a simple majority to override the Governor’s veto of non-
budgetary bills,12 Democratic Governor Earl Ray Tomblin was power-
less to stop the legislature from passing anti-abortion,13 prevailing
wage, right-to-work,14 and concealed carry legislation.15
So when Daniel Hall—whose party switch made all of those far-
reaching changes possible—announced that he would resign from the
State Senate to become the National Rifle Association’s West Virginia
state liaison,16 he created a “unique situation” for West Virginia Dem-




9. Ashton Marra, After Tuesday’s Election West Virginia’s State Senate Was Tied.
Now, It’s Not., W. VA. PUB. BROAD. (Nov. 5, 2014), https://www.wvpublic.org/post/
after-tuesdays-election-west-virginias-state-senate-was-tied-now-its-not [https://
perma.cc/2T4Z-833F].
10. Reid Wilson, Party Switch Gives Republicans Control of West Virginia Senate,
WASH. POST (Nov. 5, 2014, 7:55 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/
wp/2014/11/05/party-switch-gives-republicans-control-of-west-virginia-senate/ [https://
perma.cc/ABA6-7NPW].
11. Derek Willis, Election Was Rough for Democrats. It Was Worse for West Vir-
ginia Democrats., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/25/
upshot/election-was-rough-for-democrats-it-was-worse-for-west-virginia-democrats.
html [https://perma.cc/Q4T5-TBH4].
12. W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 14.
13. Ashton Marra, West Virginia Legislature Votes to Reverse Tomblin’s Veto of
Abortion Ban Bill, W. VA. PUB. BROAD. (Mar. 10, 2016), https://www.wvpublic.org/
post/west-virginia-legislature-votes-reverse-tomblins-veto-abortion-ban-bill [https://
perma.cc/6S6F-J9BP].
14. David Gutman, WV Right-to-Work, Prevailing Wage Vetoes Overridden,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE-MAIL (Feb. 12, 2016), https://www.wvgazettemail.com/news/
politics/wv-right-to-work-prevailing-wage-vetoes-overridden/article_-3c47-505d-acb9-
bf0723c6483c.html [https://perma.cc/3QXW-KDSX].
15. David Gutman, Legislature Overrides Tomblin, Allows Permitless Hidden
Guns, CHARLESTON GAZETTE-MAIL (Mar. 5, 2016), https://www.wvgazettemail.com/
news/politics/legislature-overrides-tomblin-allows-permitless-hidden-guns/article_79b
9c6c0-899f-5fb6-b6dc-75058bd1af0d.html [https://perma.cc/87T7-H2Q4].
16. Senator Hall Announces Resignation to Take New Job with NRA, W. VA. ME-
TRONEWS (Dec. 29, 2015, 4:18 PM), http://wvmetronews.com/2015/12/29/senator-hall-
announces-resignation-to-take-new-job-with-nra/ [https://perma.cc/X9N2-BD5T].
17. David Gutman, Tomblin’s Office: State Senator’s Resignation Creates “Unique
Situation”, CHARLESTON GAZETTE-MAIL (Dec. 29, 2015), https://www.wvgazettemail.
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filled by special elections, as is the case in many other states, but in-
stead by same-party gubernatorial appointments.18 The “party with
which the person holding the office immediately preceding the va-
cancy was affiliated at the time the vacancy occurred” is tasked with
sending the Governor a list of three candidates, one of whom is ap-
pointed by the Governor.19 The Democratic and Republican Parties
each insisted that they had the power to make nominations to the
Governor—the Democrats because Hall had been elected as a Demo-
crat in 2012, and the Republicans because Hall was a Republican at
the time of the vacancy.20 Attorney General Patrick Morrissey, a Re-
publican, issued an opinion that the Republican Party was entitled to
fill the vacancy,21 and the Chair of the West Virginia State Democratic
Executive Committee sought a writ of mandamus from the state’s Su-
preme Court of Appeals, seeking to compel Governor Tomblin to fill
the vacancy from a list of candidates that it selected.22
The Supreme Court of Appeals denied the writ, holding that the
statute unambiguously required the Governor to select a replacement
from a list generated by the Republican Party.23 The statute required
that the party to which the legislator belonged “immediately preced-
ing the vacancy” generate the list, and “Hall was affiliated with the
Republican Party immediately preceding the vacancy.”24 Justice
Robin Davis dissented, arguing that the statute was unconstitutional
“because it cannot, as it is written, carry out the will of the voters.”25
Immediately following the decision, Governor Tomblin appointed a
Republican to fill the vacancy, preserving the Party’s narrow control
of the chamber.26
The issue raised by this case—along with a handful of others from
Kansas,27 Ohio,28 and Wyoming29—presents a relatively discrete,
com///-office-state-senator-s-resignation-creates-unique-situation/_—546f-abbd-46bb
ea662e66.html [https://perma.cc/F2G2-ZZ7Q].
18. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-10-5 (West 2018).
19. Id. § 3-10-5(a).
20. State ex rel. Biafore v. Tomblin, 782 S.E.2d 223, 226 (W. Va. 2016).
21. Letter from Patrick Morrisey, W. Va. Att’y Gen., to William P. Cole III, W.
Va. Senate President (Jan. 5, 2016) (on file with the Attorney General of West Vir-
ginia’s Office), https://ago.wv.gov//%%/Documents/Senate%20Vacancy%20%20
(M011493).pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9FA-LHV3]; see also Morrisey Issues Advisory
Opinion on Hall Replacement Issue, METRONEWS (Jan. 5, 2016, 12:54 PM), http://wv
metronews.com//01/05/morrisey-issues-advisory-opinion-on-hall-replacement/ [https://
perma.cc/GNR4-9XBM].
22. Biafore, 782 S.E.2d at 226.
23. Id. at 228–29.
24. Id. at 229.
25. Id. at 240 (Davis, J., dissenting).
26. David Gutman, Appointee to Fought-Over Senate Seat No Stranger to State
Politics, CHARLESTON GAZETTE-MAIL (Jan. 25, 2016), https://www.wvgazette
mail.com/news//-fought-over-senate-seat-no-stranger-to-state/article_f0546e45-0f74-
55b2-9256-08a32801d0bc.html [https://perma.cc/3H5L-833Z].
27. See generally Wilson v. Sebelius, 72 P.3d 553 (Kan. 2003) (determining
whether same-party appointment in filling county treasurer vacancy is constitutional).
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largely unanswered question: When a state’s legislative vacancies are
filled by same-party appointments, what happens when the vacating
legislator switched parties? Some states make answering this question
relatively easy—either their statutes are drafted in a manner sug-
gesting a clear answer, or they are one of the four states with an an-
swer from its supreme court.30 But in others, which lack statutory
clarity or judicial imprimatur, this question presents real (albeit statis-
tically unlikely) political time bombs.
Accordingly, this Article suggests a way forward. It seeks to provide
an objective answer to this question—that is, under the current law,
how are these vacancies filled?—as well as one to a more aspirational
question—how should these vacancies be filled? Part II begins by lay-
ing the foundation for these questions. Which states provide for legis-
lative appointments, and through what method? How often do party-
switches and legislative vacancies occur? Part III conducts a series of
bite-sized exercises in statutory interpretation and categorizes these
state statutory schemes depending on how the present question—how
are the vacancies filled?—seems to be answered. It also reviews in
greater detail how the four state supreme courts that have answered
the question did so. Finally, Part IV addresses the core question—how
should these vacancies be filled? What statutory changes should be
made to provide courts (and appointing actors) with a clear answer to
this question? Further, given the relative rarity with which these ques-
tions present themselves, why is any of this relevant?
II. LEGISLATIVE VACANCIES AND PARTY-SWITCHING
This Part lays the intellectual framework for the remainder of the
Article. Section A provides a brief overview of the states and territo-
ries (and the District of Columbia, which, for now, is neither) in which
legislative vacancies are filled through appointments. Section B ad-
dresses several threshold matters—namely, the frequency of both
state legislative vacancies and state legislative party-switching. It also
answers more critical threshold questions, e.g., what is the impact, and
why does it matter?
A. The States in Play
Thirty-one jurisdictions in the United States employ some form of
appointment scheme to fill legislative vacancies at least some of the
time. Though these procedures are sometimes dependent on the char-
28. See generally State ex rel. Herman v. Klopfleisch, 651 N.E.2d 995 (Ohio 1995)
(finding same-party appointment in filling mayoral vacancy is constitutional).
29. See generally Richards v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 6 P.3d 1251 (Wyo. 2000) (deter-
mining whether same-party appointment in filling county commission vacancy is
constitutional).
30. See infra Part III.
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acteristics of the former legislator31 or the time at which the vacancy
occurs,32 it is nonetheless the case that these systems are pervasive
throughout the United States.
Most of the states and territories in question use some form of
same-party appointment. Only a few don’t—American Samoa, Ne-
braska, New Mexico, the Northern Mariana Islands, South Dakota,
Tennessee, and Vermont.33 Though non-same-party appointments are
outside the scope of this Article, these systems are worth briefly dis-
cussing given their unique nature. Most states utilizing non-same-
party appointments vest their governors with the responsibility of fill-
ing vacancies,34 though Tennessee exclusively delegates this power to
its county commissions,35 and in New Mexico, the power rests with
county commissions if the vacant district is located solely within one
county, and with the Governor otherwise.36 In most of these jurisdic-
tions, parties exist entirely outside the appointment process alto-
gether. This is especially true in Nebraska, which has the country’s
only nonpartisan legislature,37 making same-party appointments prac-
tically impossible. Though legislatures in American Samoa, New Mex-
ico, South Dakota, and Tennessee are elected in partisan elections,
party affiliation is not a de jure prerequisite for filling a vacancy.38 In
Vermont, though the Governor is allowed to solicit recommendations
from the former legislator’s party, she isn’t required to do so and isn’t
required to abide by the recommendation anyway.39 Interestingly, in
the Northern Mariana Islands, the Governor is held to an anti-same-
party requirement—she is obligated to appoint the runner-up from
the most recent election.40
These states are far and away the minority, however. Of the thirty-
one states with appointment procedures, the other twenty-four impose
31. For example, legislators elected as independents or poorly organized third par-
ties may be replaced through slightly different methods.
32. Some states only allow for appointments if the vacancy occurs past a certain
point in the legislator’s term or close enough to the next regularly scheduled election.
33. S.D. CONST. art. III, § 10; N. MAR. I. CONST. art. II, § 9; NEB. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 32-566 (West 2020); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 2-7C-5, 2-8D-4 (West 2020); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 2-14-202 (West 2019); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2623 (West 2020); AM.
SAMOA CODE ANN. §§ 2.0204, 6.0108 (2011).
34. S.D. CONST. art. III, § 10; N. MAR. I. CONST. art. II, § 9; NEB. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 32-566 (West 2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2623 (West 2020); AM. SAMOA
CODE ANN. §§ 2.0204, 6.0108 (2011).
35. TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-14-202 (West 2019).
36. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 2-7C-5, 2-8D-4 (West 2020).
37. Kim Robak, The Nebraska Unicameral and Its Lasting Benefits, 76 NEB. L.
REV. 791, 805 (1997).
38. S.D. CONST. art. III, § 10; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 2-7C-5, 2-8D-4 (West 2020);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-14-202 (West 2019); AM. SAMOA CODE ANN. §§ 2.0204, 6.0108
(2011).
39. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2623 (West 2020).
40. N. MAR. I. CONST. art. II, § 9.
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a strict same-party requirement.41 In these states, the governors,
county commissions, and political parties themselves are the most
common actors responsible for filling legislative vacancies.42 Gover-
nors are responsible for appointment in nine jurisdictions, county
commissions in six, and political parties in seventeen. (These numbers
don’t add up to twenty-four because there’s a great deal of power
shared amongst them.) In three other jurisdictions—Alaska, Ohio,
and Puerto Rico—the legislature, or the presiding officers thereof, are
vested with appointment or confirmation powers.43
Examining the mechanics of these procedures certainly reveals
commonalities among them, but no majority rule or dominant scheme.
Take, for example, the nine states and territories in which governors
fill legislative vacancies. In five of those states, the governor merely
serves as a rubber stamp on the selection of the party, perhaps to add
democratic legitimacy—the governor possesses no power to reject the
party’s nominee, and in some states, if she refuses to appoint the
party’s nominee, the nominee is installed anyway. In three of the
other states, the governor does not make an entirely volitional
choice—she is restricted to picking from a list of nominees generated
by the state party. And in the final state, Alaska, the Governor may
nominate whomever she likes, but the party’s legislative caucus may
reject that nominee. In other words, no state trusts its governor
enough to select a same-party replacement entirely of her own choice.
It’s a similar story for county commissions, though they are granted
a meaningful amount of additional latitude. No county commission
rubber-stamps the party’s single nominee, for example, and in Ne-
vada, the county commission can make a same-party appointment of
its choice with no party involvement whatsoever. The other five states
require county commissions to pick from a set list of nominees—usu-
ally three—generated by the state party.
The seventeen states in which political parties play a role feature
much more diversity. Ten of them have been mentioned previously,
and they feature interaction between the parties and either the gover-
nor or county commission. Of the remaining seven, six of them grant
full appointment authority to the political party directly. Puerto Rico
presents an unusual case in which the legislature’s presiding officers
sometimes serve as the formal appointing authority of the party’s
nominee—like the aforementioned rubber-stamp governors—and in
other cases, the party makes the appointment itself.44
41. Tyler Yeargain, The Legal History of State Legislative Vacancies and Tempo-
rary Appointments, 28 J.L. & POL’Y 564, 610 (2020).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 16, § 4146 (2020).
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B. Frequency and Impact
There’s no getting around the obvious—regardless of how states fill
their vacancies, both state legislative vacancies and party-switching
are relatively infrequent events separately and are even unlikelier
combined. Though research on their prevalence is sparse, the best
available data suggest that legislative vacancies occur at a rate of
about 3.4% every two years.45 In other words, per 100 legislators in a
given two-year term, a little more than 3 legislators will resign, die, or
be removed through expulsion or recall.46 (Though the first two are
much likelier than the last.47) The rate of legislative vacancies is a fre-
quency roughly on par with the frequency of blue moons.48
The same is true for party-switching. Over a nearly thirty-year pe-
riod, approximately 400 state legislators switched parties—a number
that is large in absolute terms but reflects only 0.2% of all legislators
during that time period.49 Party-switching is disproportionately more
likely to occur in states that employ special elections, not temporary
appointments, to fill legislative vacancies. Over the past thirty years,
the majority of party switches in state legislatures occurred in the
South,50 and the vast majority of those occurred in deep southern
45. Keith Hamm & David M. Olson, Midsession Vacancies: Why Do State Legisla-
tors Exit and How Are They Replaced?, in CHANGING PATTERNS IN STATE LEGISLA-
TIVE CAREERS 127, 133 (Gary F. Moncrief & Joel A. Thompson eds., 1992). This rate
may increase as states impose term limits or see the imposition of less-gerrymandered
legislative maps. See, e.g., BRUCE E. CAIN & THAD KOUSSER, ADAPTING TO TERM
LIMITS: RECENT EXPERIENCES AND NEW DIRECTIONS 6–8 (2004) (discussing the
spikes in California state legislative elections following 1973 court-ordered redistrict-
ing and imposition of term limits in the early 1990s); Gary F. Moncrief et al., Time,
Term Limits, and Turnover: Trends in Membership Stability in U.S. State Legislatures,
29 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 357, 375–76 (2004).
46. See Hamm & Olson, supra note 45, at 133. R
47. Hamm and Olson estimate that “involuntary” vacancies—those caused by
death, arrest, or recall—constitute about 29% of all legislative vacancies, with dying
as the most popular way to involuntarily leave legislative service. Id. at 130. Only
thirty-nine recall elections have ever occurred for state legislators, 55% of which were
successful, and in the last half-century, only around twenty legislators have been ex-
pelled. Nat’l Conf. of State Legislators, Expulsions of State Legislators Are Rare, THE
THICKET AT ST. LEGISLATURES (Apr. 1, 2013), https://ncsl.typepad.com/the_thicket/
2013/04/expulsions-of-state-legislators-are-rare.html [https://perma.cc/8ERV-X9G5];
Recall of State Officials, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATORS (July 8, 2019), http://
www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/recall-of-state-officials.aspx [https://
perma.cc/LFB5-HZU6].
48. Ethan Siegel, How Rare is the All-in-One Supermoon, Blue Moon, and Lunar
Eclipse, Really?, FORBES (Jan. 24, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
startswithabang/2018/01/24/how-rare-is-the-all-in-one-supermoon-blue-moon-and-lun
ar-eclipse-really/#381676cc3cf2 [https://perma.cc/46X8-A3Z8] (noting that blue moons
occur “about 7 times every 19 years: a little more frequently than once every 3 years,”
or about 2.7% of the time).
49. Boris Shor, Out of Step, Out of Party: Party Switching in American State Leg-
islatures 4, 11 (June 4, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Author).
50. Id. at 5, 7.
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\8-1\TWL101.txt unknown Seq: 9 28-OCT-20 7:38
2020] THE PROBLEM OF PARTY-SWITCHING 171
states.51 But of the sixteen states (and the District of Columbia) in the
South,52 only five—Maryland, North Carolina, Tennessee, West Vir-
ginia, and the District of Columbia—ever use appointments instead of
elections. Meanwhile, only 20% of legislative party switches occurred
in the Midwest and West,53 where nineteen out of twenty-five states
use appointments.54 As a result, it has been statistically unlikely that a
legislator switching parties and then vacating her seat prior to the next
election—voluntarily or involuntarily—would occur in a state with a
same-party replacement system. Accordingly, resolving the legal ques-
tion of which party is entitled to replace the former legislator who
switched parties has rarely been necessary.
Neither of these realities, however, suggest that the interaction of
party-switching and legislative vacancies is irrelevant. For a start,
party-switching has tangible consequences. Some of the most promi-
nent party-switchers ended up successfully running for statewide of-
fice over the last few decades—especially Democratic-to-Republican
party-switchers in the deep south, which frequently enabled them to
win control of offices for their new parties for the first time since Re-
construction.55 An even more serious consequence of party-switching
among state legislators is the result that it has on partisan control of
state legislatures, especially in closely-divided chambers. Since 1980,
at least thirteen state legislative houses have changed party control
solely as the result of party-switching by their members.56
Vacancies have consequences, too, but the results are less-estab-
lished. Though it’s uncommon for special elections (or appointments)
following vacancies to decide control of state legislative chambers,
there are certainly cases where it has happened. For example, in 2017,
Democrats held on to a State Senate seat in Delaware that allowed
them to retain control of the chamber; had they lost the seat, Republi-
cans would have gained control of the chamber for the first time since
1972.57 Later that year, a special election for a State Senate seat in
Washington allowed Democrats to win control of the chamber and
51. James M. Glaser, When Legislators Change Sides: The Implications of Party
Defections in the South, in EYE OF THE STORM: THE SOUTH AND CONGRESS IN AN
ERA OF CHANGE 3, 70–71 (John C. Kuzenski et al. eds., 2001); see also Shor, supra
note 49, at 11. R
52. See generally Census Regions and Divisions of the United States, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, https://www2.census.gov/geo/pdfs/maps-data/maps/reference/us_regdiv.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K3TL-J7B5].
53. Shor, supra note 49, at 5. R
54. Yeargain, supra note 41, at 602–15. R
55. ANTOINE YOSHINAKA, CROSSING THE AISLE: PARTY SWITCHING BY US LEG-
ISLATORS IN THE POSTWAR ERA 88–89 (2015).
56. Specifically, party-switchers swung the control of the Georgia Senate (2003),
Kentucky Senate (1999), Maine House (thrice from 1995 to 1996), Mississippi Senate
(2007), Montana Senate (2007), North Carolina House (2003), Pennsylvania House
(1994), Pennsylvania Senate (1992), and Washington Senate (1980). Id. at 86–94.
57. Janet Hook, Newly Energized Liberals Pour Record Effort into Local Races,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/liberal-activists-pour-record
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gain unified control in the state.58 Similarly, in 2014, after Democratic
State Senator Phillip Puckett resigned his seat—apparently in ex-
change for being appointed to the state tobacco commission and for
his daughter being appointed to a judgeship59—Republicans were
able to pick up his dark-red seat, and with it the Virginia State Senate,
in the ensuing special election.60 And in West Virginia, as previously
mentioned, West Virginia State Senator Daniel Hall switched to the
Republican Party after the 2014 election, giving the Republicans a
one-vote majority in the chamber, before resigning in 2016, putting
control of the chamber on the line.61 Less dramatically, Democrats
won special elections in 2015 and 2017 that allowed them to end
Republicans’ supermajority control in both the Georgia House and
Senate.62
Due to the rarity of both vacancies and party-switching in state leg-
islatures, it is unsurprising that no studies have been done on the fre-
quency of both occurring simultaneously or on the role that party-
switching plays in states that fill vacancies through same-party ap-
pointments. But that may be a function of where the bulk of party-
switching occurs. In most of the states in the deep south, along with
ancestrally Democratic areas in Arkansas, Kentucky, Oklahoma, and
West Virginia, old-school, Blue Dog Democrats have completely bot-
tomed out.63 Few Democratic state legislators remain in these areas,
meaning that the era of Southern-dominated party-switching may be
coming to a close.
-amounts-of-time-and-money-local-gop-strongholds-1491925602 [https://perma.cc/
7K4J-QT2Z].
58. Joseph O’Sullivan, With Manka Dhingra’s Washington State Senate Win, Dem-
ocrats Plot Ambitious Course in Olympia, SEATTLE TIMES, https://www.seattletimes
.com//politics/manka-dhingras-double-digit-lead-in-45th-district-senate-race-sends-
message-to-trump-gov-inslee-says/ [https://perma.cc/SM9U-CT93].
59. Laura Vozzella, Puckett Resignation Inquiry Yields No Charges, WASH. POST
(Dec. 12, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/federal-prose
cutors-will-not-charge-puckett-in-virginia-senate-resignation-scandal/2014/12/12/b86
eb5a8-8230-11e4-81fd-8c4814dfa9d7_story.html [https://perma.cc/H39K-MVZ9].
60. Laura Vozzella & Wesley Robinson, GOP Win in Southwest Virginia Senate




61. See generally supra Part I.
62. Dayana Morales Gomez, Georgia Democrat Wins House Seat on Platform
Against Gay Discriminaton, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 14, 2015, 4:11 PM), https://www.
huffpost.com/entry/georgia-taylor-bennett_n_55cd0d8ae4b07addcb4281e5 [https://
perma.cc/UVC7-7TTQ]; Maya T. Prabhu, Georgia Republicans Eye Reclaiming At-




63. See supra notes 4–7. R
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Accordingly, it may be helpful to consider where the next phase of
party-switching is likely to take place: the suburbs and areas with bur-
geoning Latinx populations. Though it has largely been the case over
the last few decades that more Democrats have switched to the Re-
publican Party than vice-versa, that may be changing as suburban
America and the West trend toward the Democrats.64 Since an align-
ment in 2016, for example, more Republicans have switched to the
Democratic Party than vice-versa.65 Most of those party switches took
place in states that use appointments, not special elections, to fill va-
cancies,66 perhaps suggesting that more vacancies will occur as the re-
sult of party-switching.
III. THE CURRENT LEGAL REALITY
A critical (and obvious) component of same-party appointments is
measuring what “same-party” means in each instance. “Same-party” is
relatively obvious in most situations. Imagine, for example, the clear-
est possible case: A legislator, who has repeatedly been elected as the
Democratic nominee, and who served, until recently, as the Demo-
cratic Party’s floor leader in the State Senate, resigns in a state with
same-party appointments. In that instance, the succession plan is
clear; she would be replaced by a Democrat. In the vast majority of
cases, this is roughly the context that is presented: Legislators vacating
their seats were elected as the nominees of, and at the time of their
vacancy were members of, the same party.
Party-switchers present a different situation, however. When there’s
a mismatch between the party nomination from the most recent elec-
tion and party membership at the time of the vacancy, what does (or
should) win out? This Part seeks to answer the objective question of
what actually does happen, or might reasonably be predicted to hap-
pen. Section A begins by identifying how state statutes and constitu-
tions determine a vacating legislator’s “party” for the purpose of
filling her vacancy. It identifies several different answers to the ques-
tion, which focus on the distinction between party nomination and
membership. Then, Section B reviews the available caselaw from
Ohio, Wyoming, Kansas, and West Virginia—the only states that have
even tangentially answered this question—to determine how courts
64. See Aaron Blake, Trump Spurs an Uptick in Politicians Leaving the GOP,
WASH. POST (Apr. 24, 2019, 10:45 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
2019/04/24/trump-spurs-an-uptick-politicians-leaving-gop/ [https://perma.cc/ 9XPZ-47
PU] (Since 1994, “71 state lawmakers have switched from Democrat to Republican,
while 18 have switched from the GOP to the Democratic Party. Only twice over that
span have we had more Republicans switching to Democrats than Democrats switch-
ing Republicans in consecutive years: the tail-end of George W. Bush’s presidency
(2006–[20]07) and the last two years of Trump’s.”).
65. Id.
66. Compare id., with supra Part II.A.
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have answered this question. It then compares the answers from the
caselaw to the answers from Section A’s statutory interpretation.
A. The Statutory Answer
Every state answers the question, “Which party?” Some of them
answer it better and more clearly than others. Only Arizona’s same-
party appointment statute explicitly addresses how vacancies caused
by party-switching legislators are filled—it provides that the political
party the legislator was nominated by at the most recent election is
responsible for nominating a list of replacements.67 The remaining
states may not answer the question of party-switching directly, but a
plain reading of the statutes (and some constitutional provisions) at
issue shows that most of them provide some sort of implicit answer.
These states fall into one of three camps: (1) those that fill the vacancy
depending on the legislator’s affiliation or membership; (2) those that
fill it depending on which party nominated the legislator; and (3)
those that provide no clarity whatsoever. The following discussion ad-
dresses the three camps in turn.
1. Affiliation or Membership
Four states—Colorado, Kansas, North Dakota, and West Virginia—
along with the District of Columbia, appear to look to the legislator’s
party affiliation or membership at the time of the vacancy itself. In
identifying the legislator’s political party, these statutes reference the
party “represented by the former member,”68 the party with which the
former member “is affiliated,”69 the party “of which the officer . . .
whose position has become vacant was a member,”70 or the party
“with which the person holding the office immediately preceding the
vacancy was affiliated at the time the vacancy occurred.”71
This emphasis on affiliation or membership implicitly—and in the
case of West Virginia, explicitly—suggests a temporal connection be-
tween the party and the vacancy itself.72 Though we might reasonably
67. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1202(C) (West 2018) (“For the purposes of this
section, ‘appropriate political party’ means the same political party of which the per-
son who was elected to or appointed to the office was a member immediately before
the vacancy occurred except that if the person vacating the office changed political
party affiliation after taking office, the person who is appointed to fill the vacancy
shall be of the same political party that the vacating officeholder was when the vacat-
ing officeholder was elected or appointed to that office.”).
68. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-203 (West 2017); see also N.D. CENT. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-13-10 (West 2009).
69. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-204.01 (West 2013).
70. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-3901, 25-3902, 25-3903 (West 2016).
71. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-10-5 (West 2018).
72. Beyond the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals decision in Biafore, the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals held—albeit in a different context—that the
word “affiliated” has a meaning “delimit[ed] . . . to party affiliation (or not) as shown
by formal registration” and explicitly rejected the argument that “affiliated” should
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want these statutes to make the temporal connection more explicit—
e.g., the party with which the former member “is affiliated” at what
point?—the text is clear enough to establish that party-switching legis-
lative vacancies ought to be filled by the party of the member at the
time of the vacancy.
Two other additions here are Alaska and Illinois, at least as they
provide for filling vacancies caused by legislators elected as independ-
ents. Both states normally fall into the second category, which deter-
mines party replacement by which party nominated the legislator, but
provide a different method for filling independent vacancies in some
situations. In Alaska, when a legislator is elected as an independent
but is formally recognized “as a member of a party caucus of members
of the legislature,” that counts as recognition of a person’s party mem-
bership for purposes of filling the vacancy.73 Similarly, in Illinois, if
the assembly’s lawmakers pass a resolution allowing an independent
“to affiliate with a political party,” the political party with which she is
affiliated at the time of the vacancy is responsible for filling it.74
2. Nomination or Election
Most of the remaining states and territories—Alaska, Illinois, Indi-
ana, Maryland, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon,
be determined “by examining [the candidate’s] day-to-day ‘associations’ with one
party or another[.]”  Kabel v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 962 A.2d 919, 920–22
(D.C. 2008). The court in Kabel didn’t decide the meaning of “affiliated” in the con-
text of vacancy caused by a party-switcher, but rather by the election of a candidate to
the District of Columbia City Council who had switched from the Democratic Party
to “no party,” but nonetheless retained an informal and somewhat abstract member-
ship with the Democratic Party. Id. at 920. The question of the candidate’s affiliation
was relevant because the District of Columbia doesn’t allow more than three at-large
city councilmembers to be “affiliated with the same political party.” Id. (quoting D.C.
CODE 1.20-4.01(d)(3)). Nonetheless, despite the different context, its holding is sup-
portive of the conclusion that “affiliated” refers to temporary membership. Id.
73. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 15.40.330(b) (West 2019). It doesn’t appear that this
system accounts for legislators who are elected as members of one party but join a
cross-partisan governing coalition with another party or parties, as frequently happens
in Alaska. While this doesn’t often become relevant, the recent death of Alaska State
Representative Gary Knopp—who was elected as a Republican, joined a cross-party
coalition of Democrats and Republicans, and refused to change his party affiliation—
and his scheduled replacement by a run-of-the-mill Republican perhaps reflects some
inadequacies with the current system. See Elizabeth Earl, Despite Republicans’ Ire,
Knopp Says He Won’t Resign or Change Party, ALASKA J. OF COM. (Feb. 18, 2019),
https://www.alaskajournal.com/2019-02-18/despite-republicans%E2%80%99-ire-
knopp-says-he-wont-resign-or-change-party [https://perma.cc/B2Y3-NUG9]; Sean
Maguire, Alaska GOP Names 3 Candidates to Replace Late Rep. Gary Knopp, MSN
(Aug. 14, 2020), https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/politics/alaska-gop-names-3-candi
dates-to-replace-late-rep-gary-knopp/ar-BB17YGL5 [https://perma.cc/VT4J-R5FG].
74. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/25-6(b) (West 2019). For a greater discussion of
how states that fill legislative vacancies through same-party appointments account for
independent and third-party legislators, see Tyler Yeargain, Third Wheeling in the
Two-Party System: How Same-Party Replacement Systems Impede the Replacement of
Independent and Third-Party Legislators, 123 W. VA. L. REV. (forthcoming Fall 2020).
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Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Wyoming—define “party”
based on which party nominated the previous incumbent or the affilia-
tion of the incumbent when she was elected. The usual result of the
constitutional and statutory language used by these states is likely the
same, but how they get there differs in a way that could produce dif-
ferent results in different contexts.
For example, five states—Alaska, Illinois, Nevada, New Jersey, and
Oregon—along with Puerto Rico, focus on the party of the legislator
as measured by formal nomination or ballot placement by a political
party. This language refers to the party that “nominated the predeces-
sor in office,”75 the party that “elected such” legislator,76 the party “of
which the incumbent was the nominee,”77 the party “by which the
elected predecessor in the office was designated on the election bal-
lot,”78 the party that the legislator was “elected in representation
of,”79 or the party “of which the incumbent was a candidate at the
time of [her] election.”80
Contrast those states with Indiana, Maryland, North Carolina,
Ohio, and Wyoming, which determine party affiliation based on the
previous incumbent’s membership at the time of the election. These
states refer to the party that the previous incumbent was a member of
when she was “elected or selected,”81 the “same political party [of the
previous incumbent] at the time of the last election or appointment,”82
the party “with which the vacating member was affiliated when
elected,”83 the “same political party as the person last elected by the
electors to the seat,”84 or the party that “the last incumbent repre-
sented at the time of [her] election.”85
In either the usual case or the case of a party-switcher elected with
one party who switched to another, the result would be the same. But
as it’s applied to candidates in more unusual situations, the former’s
focus on formal nomination may cause absurd results. In some states,
ballot access requirements are so stringent and mechanically enforced
that they’re regularly used by campaigns to kick their opponents off
75. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 15.40.330 (West 2019).
76. NEV. CONST. art. 4, § 12.
77. N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 4, para. 1. In its statutory enactment of this provision,
New Jersey has further made clear that “the vacancy shall be filled . . . by a member of
the political party of which the person who vacated the office was the candidate at the
time of his election thereto.” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:27-11.2 (West 1988) (emphasis
added).
78. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 236.100 (West 2020).
79. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 16, § 4146 (2011) (amended 2014).
80. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/25-6(b) (West 2019).
81. IND. CODE ANN. § 3-13-5-0.1 (West 2020).
82. MD. CONST. art. III, § 13.
83. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163–11(b)–(d) (West 2019).
84. OHIO CONST. art. II, § 11.
85. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-18-111 (West 2018).
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the ballot.86 This can result in oddities in individual elections. Take,
for example, a 2017 special election for a safely Democratic state
house district in Philadelphia, wherein the Democratic nominee was
kicked off the ballot over residency issues, leaving only Republican
and Green Party nominees.87 The local Democratic Party organized a
write-in effort, and Emilio Vazquez, the de facto Democratic nominee,
running as a write-in, ended up overwhelmingly winning.88 But Vaz-
quez, despite being a registered Democrat and running with the
party’s explicit support, wasn’t elected as a Democrat. So in a same-
party appointment system that determines party based on which party
nominated the legislator, a vacating legislator elected like Vazquez
would present a gray area.
Nonetheless, that (unlikely89) scenario notwithstanding, these states
chart a clear path forward: a legislator’s party, for purposes of filling
her vacancy, is determined by how she was elected. Therefore, in a
case where a legislator was elected as a Republican and switched to
86. See, e.g., Steve Edwards, How to Kick Your Opponent Off the Ballot, WBEZ
(Nov. 26, 2010, 8:35 PM), https://www.wbez.org/shows/wbez-blogs/how-to-kick-your-
opponent-off-the-ballot/8fe5cdd6-cada-4d5d-b2dd-9fbe2d44d976 [https://perma.cc/
44XF-H9E7]; see generally Nathaniel Persily, Candidates v. Parties: The Constitutional
Constraints on Primary Ballot Access Laws, 89 GEO. L.J. 2181 (2001).
87. Claire Sasko, Democratic Write-In Candidate Emilio Vazquez Wins Special
Election, PHILLY MAG. (Mar. 24, 2017, 2:21 PM), https://www.phillymag.com/news/
2017/03/24/democrat-emilio-vazquez-special-election/ [https://perma.cc/4CZU-SZ68].
88. Id.
89. Little data exist on how frequently write-in candidates are elected, but com-
mon sense dictates that it is not often. Many states do not allow voters to write in
candidates or severely restrict it, see Michelle Logan, Note, The Right to Write-In:
Voting Rights and the First Amendment, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 727, 728 n.11, 734 (1993),
and “[w]rite-ins usually account for less than 1[%] of all votes cast.”  Denise Lu &
Kevin Uhrmacher, Planning to Write in Paul Ryan or Bernie Sanders? It Won’t Count
in Most States., WASH. POST (Nov. 3, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graph
ics/politics/2016-election/write-in-votes/ [https://perma.cc/8GQC-QB5Q]. Further-
more, write-in victories are relatively notable, which serves as further indicia of their
rarity. See, e.g., Nancy Eve Cohen, Jo Comerford Prevails as Write-in Candidate in
Massachusetts Legislative Dem Primary, NEW ENG. PUB. RADIO (Sept. 5, 2018),
https://www.nepr.net/post/jo-comerford-prevails-write-candidate-massachusetts-legis-
lative-dem-primary#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/KNT3-7K2Y] (noting Massachusetts
State Senator Jo Comerford’s write-in primary victory); Sasko, supra note 87, at 11 R
(noting Pennsylvania State Representative Emilio Vazquez’s write-in victory);
Sandhya Somashekhar, In Alaska’s Senate Race, Murkowski’s Write-in Bid Bears
Fruit, WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 2010, 12:25 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/11/03/AR2010110308817.html [https://perma.cc/E77A-M895]
(noting U.S. Senator Lisa Murkowki’s write-in victory); see also Laura Vozzella, From
Shoo-in to Write-in: Paperwork Stumble Forces a Va. Republican to Run the Hard
Way, WASH. POST (Oct. 23, 2019, 3:36 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com//vir-
ginia-politics/from-shoo-in-to-write-in-paperwork-stumble-forces-a-va-republican-to-
run-the-hard-way/2019/10/22/e1831770-ef74-11e9-b648-76bcf86eb67e_story.html
[https://perma.cc/D4F6-KAMS] (noting that, prior to State Delegate Nick Freitas’s
successful 2019 write-in campaign, the last time that a write-in won “was in 1989,
when independent Jackie Stump, president of the local coal miners’ union in far
southwest Virginia, pulled one off in the midst of a bitter strike to win a House of
Delegates seat”).
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no-party affiliation, she would likely be replaced by a Republican. In-
deed, this was the exact scenario presented in Maryland in 2009, when
State Delegate Richard Weldon, who was initially elected as a Repub-
lican but became an independent afterwards, resigned from office.90
Because Weldon was elected as a Republican, the local Republican
Party nominated his replacement, who was formally appointed to fill
Weldon’s vacancy by then-Governor Martin O’Malley.91
3. The States That Provide No Clarity
But regardless of how we may quibble over the efficacy of the first
two systems, they are unequivocally better than the third. Hawai'i,
Idaho, Montana, Utah, and Washington provide no meaningful clarity
whatsoever. In imposing a same-party replacement system, these
states stick to those words—“same party”—and no more.92 All of
these frameworks use pretty much the same language, so let’s consider
Idaho’s. Under state law, the “legislative district committee of the
same political party, if any, of the former member whose seat is va-
cant” submits three nominees to the Governor, who picks one.93 This
presents an obvious problem: the same political party, as of when? Is
it the same party as of the election? As of the vacancy? The constitu-
tional and statutory frameworks in these states exist in blissful igno-
rance, providing no answer at all.
They certainly should. Hawai'i, in particular, is disproportionately
likely to face this question: it requires same-party replacement, pro-
vides no elaboration on when party membership or affiliation is deter-
mined, and has faced the highest number of party-switching legislators
outside of the South.94 And in Idaho, Utah, and Washington, a diversi-
fying population and blue-trending metropolitan areas95 could lay the
90. House of Delegates: Former Delegates, MD. MANUAL ON-LINE, https://msa
.maryland.gov/msa/mdmanual/06hse/former/html/msa13978.html [https://perma.cc/
E9Y6-LR8V].
91. Julie Bykowicz, Final Three Selected for Frederick County Delegate Seat, BALT.
SUN (Jan. 4, 2010, 10:13 AM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/bs-mtblog-2010-01-final_
three_selected__y.html [https://perma.cc/P3PU-CHNR].
92. HAW. REV. STAT. § 17-3(a)(1) (2020) (“same political party as the prior incum-
bent”); IDAHO CODE § 59-904A (2020) (“the same political party, if any, of the for-
mer member whose seat is vacant”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 5-2-403(1) (2019) (“the
same political party”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-1-503(2), (3)(b) (West 2019) (“same
political party as the prior representative”); WASH. CONST. art. II, § 15 (“the same
political party as the legislator . . . whose office has been vacated”).
93. IDAHO CODE § 59-904A (2019) (emphasis added).
94. See Ian Lovett, Hawaii Republicans, Down to Five Members in the State Legis-
lature, Try to Regroup, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 24, 2017), at A3; Darwin Peng, Why Hawaii
Is a One-Party State, HARV. POL. REV. (Apr. 12, 2017), https://harvardpolitics.com/
united-states/why-hawaii-is-a-one-party-state/ [https://perma.cc/62CL-GXC6].
95. Daniel Allott, The Next Red State to Turn Purple: Utah, WASH. EXAM’R (Apr.
17, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/the-next-red-state-
to-turn-purple-utah [https://perma.cc/224N-NT75]; Kirk Johnson, What the Fastest
Growth in the U.S. Means for Idaho Politics, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2018), https://
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groundwork for Republican state legislators to switch parties as a
means of political survival.
B. The Jurisprudential Answer
For the most part, the four state supreme courts—Ohio, Wyoming,
Kansas, and West Virginia—that have answered the question of how
to fill party-switcher vacancies have echoed the categorization identi-
fied in Section A. It is worth noting at the outset that only one of
these cases—the aforementioned case from West Virginia—actually
involves legislative vacancies. The others involve vacancies in the of-
fices of county treasurer, county commissioner, and mayor. However,
because the constitutional provisions and laws governing these sys-
tems are roughly the same, regardless of the office in question, these
cases are largely on-point. The following Subsections discuss the cases
in chronological order because the cases articulate two different
schools of thought and generally cite each other.
1. Ohio: State ex rel. Herman v. Klopfleisch (1995)
Herman was the first case, in a state wherein vacancies are filled by
same-party appointments, that addressed how to fill vacancies caused
by party-switchers. The case involved a dispute over which party was
entitled to fill the mayoral vacancy in the City of Celina, Ohio.96
James Mustard won the Democratic Party’s nomination for mayor
and, subsequently, the general election in 1991.97 Prior to the election,
however, he had apparently spoken with the chairman of the Mercer
County, Ohio, Republican Party about running as a Republican,
which he was legally unable to do.98 Accordingly, after winning the
1991 election, Mustard voted in the 1992 and 1994 Republican prima-
ries, publicly joined the Republican Party, and became a member of
the Mercer County Republican Central Committee.99 In 1994, prior to
the 1995 mayoral election, Mustard resigned.100
Ohio statutes provided that mayoral vacancies were filled “by a per-
son chosen by the residents of the city who are members of the city
central committee . . . of the political party with which the last occu-
pant of the office was affiliated.”101 Accordingly, both parties believed
www.nytimes.com/2018/05/13/us/boise-idaho-primary-election-growth [https://
perma.cc/EC7L-SJVE]; Jessica Lee, Worked Up in Washington: Seattle Rallies Against
President Donald Trump with Its Own Progressive Agenda, U.S. NEWS (Oct. 2, 2017,
12:01 AM), https://www.usnews.com//best-states/articles/2017-10-02/washington-vot
ers-divided-as-seattle-becomes-more-liberal [https://perma.cc/4RY6-9PHL].
96. State ex rel. Herman v. Klopfleisch, 651 N.E.2d 995, 996 (Ohio 1995).




101. Id. at 997 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 733.08 (West 1997), amended by
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 733.08 (West 2016)) (emphasis added).
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that they were entitled to fill the vacancy—the Democrats because
Mustard was elected mayor as the Democratic nominee, and the
Republicans because Mustard was a Republican when he resigned.102
The Ohio Secretary of State determined that the Republican replace-
ment, Craig Klopfleisch, should be issued a certificate of appointment,
and so the Democratic replacement, Henry Herman, sought a writ of
quo warranto seeking Klopfleisch’s ouster as mayor.103
The Ohio Supreme Court noted that the word “affiliated” in the
statute “signifies a condition of being in close connection, allied, or
associated as a member,” citing Black’s Law Dictionary.104 It went on
to state that because the meaning of “affiliated” was unclear in con-
text, the statute itself was ambiguous, and therefore the court would
employ canons of construction to interpret the statute’s meaning.105
The court then considered another statute, which related to legal chal-
lenges to a voter’s ability to vote in a partisan primary and also used
the word “affiliated.”106 That statute noted that voter affiliation was
determined “by examining the elector’s voting record for the current
year and the next two preceding calendar years as shown on the
voter’s registration card.”107 Accordingly, the court read the ambigu-
ous statute in pari materia with that statute, and looked to Mustard’s
voting history, which showed that he had voted in the last two Repub-
lican primaries.108 The court rejected Herman’s argument that “affili-
ated” had a meaning equivalent to “elected as,” a phrase used in the
replacement statute regarding a mayor elected as an independent, de-
termining that the legislature “presumably intended different results
for the two situations when it used ‘affiliated’ in one portion of [the
statute] and ‘elected as’ in another.”109
It’s worth noting, however, that the Ohio statute interpreted in Her-
man differs quite substantially from the Ohio constitutional provision
providing for same-party appointments to fill legislative vacancies.
The statute in Herman merely referred to the “political party with
which the last occupant of the office was affiliated.”110 But the Ohio
Constitution’s provision for legislative vacancies suggests that the
party responsible for filling a vacancy is “the same political party as
the person last elected by the electors to the seat which has become
vacant.”111
102. Id. at 996.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 998.
105. Id.
106. Id. (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3513.19).
107. Id. (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3513.19).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 999.
110. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 733.08 (West 1997), amended by OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 733.08 (West 2016).
111. OHIO CONST. art. II, § 11 (emphasis added).
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2. Wyoming: Richards v. Board of County Commissioners of
Sweetwater County (2000)
The Supreme Court of Wyoming reached a different result in Rich-
ards, albeit with a materially different statute. In this case, Elwin
McGrew was elected as a Democrat to the Sweetwater County, Wyo-
ming, Board of County Commissioners in 1996.112 He subsequently
switched to the Republican Party in 1999 and resigned several months
later.113
The Wyoming statute that governed filling county commission va-
cancies provided that the “county central committee of the political
party to which the member whose office is vacant belonged” was re-
sponsible for filling the vacancy.114 Accordingly, the Sweetwater
County Board of Commissioners notified the county’s Democratic
Party of the vacancy, which prompted Island Richards, the chairman
of the county’s Republican Party, to file a declaratory action.115
The court aptly summed the question presented: “[T]he parties
come to us with a question which requires this Court to finish the first
sentence in [the statute], that is, ‘the political party to which the mem-
ber whose office is vacant belonged’ when?”116 It concluded that the
statute was ambiguous and resorted to “general principles of statutory
construction” to ascertain legislative intent.117 It noted that its review
of “the ‘historical setting surrounding [the statute’s] enactment,’ ‘the
conditions of law and all other contemporaneous facts and circum-
stances,’ including both parties’ persuasive arguments and counter-ar-
guments,” was unhelpful in determining legislative intent.118 However,
in considering “the mischief the act was intended to cure,” the court
determined that, generally, when the legislature failed to provide for a
specific situation, it enacted the law “assuming the situation that oc-
curs in the majority of instances.”119 Therefore, because party-switch-
ing is “a relatively rare and infrequent occurrence,” a public official
leaving office is usually “affiliated with the political party which sup-
ported him in the last election.”120 Moreover, the court determined
that “[i]t would be contrary to public policy to allow” a party-switcher
to “frustrate the assumption of the political party which supported
him that a person from that political party would hold that office until
the next election.”121 Accordingly, it concluded that “the statute
call[ed] for the board of county commissioners to notify the central
112. Richards v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 6 P.3d 1251, 1252 (Wyo. 2000).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1253 (quoting WYO. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-524 (1999)) (emphasis added).
115. Id. at 1252.
116. Id. at 1253.
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committee of the party to which the former member belonged at the
time of the last election.”122
3. Kansas: Wilson v. Sebelius (2003)
A similar situation presented in Kansas through Wilson. Here, Rita
Cline was elected Shawnee County, Kansas, Treasurer in 2000 as the
Democratic nominee.123 But shortly after being inaugurated in 2001,
Cline switched to the Republican Party.124 She resigned in 2003 as a
registered Republican.125 The Kansas statute providing for filling par-
tisan vacancies was less conceptually clear than the Ohio or Wyoming
statutes, and provided that “such vacancy shall be filled by appoint-
ment by the governor of the person elected to be so appointed by a
district convention.”126 The statute providing for district conventions
required the county chairperson of the political party to “call and con-
vene a convention of all committeemen and committeewomen of the
party of the precincts in such district for the purpose of electing a per-
son to be appointed by the governor to fill the vacancy.”127
Accordingly, both Parties determined that they were entitled to fill
the vacancy and held conventions to that effect. The Democrats nomi-
nated Larry Wilson as Cline’s replacement, and the Republicans nom-
inated Chearie Donaldson, and both parties sent their nominees to
then-Governor Kathleen Sebelius.128 Wilson and the Democratic
Party filed for a writ of mandamus and quo warranto with the Kansas
Supreme Court.129
The court, therefore, had to determine what the language “of the
party [of the prior incumbent]” meant in the Kansas statute.130 It con-
sidered arguments from the Republican Party that “of the party”
“must be construed to mean the public official’s party at the time the
vacancy occurs in order to avoid a situation in which no party is au-
thorized to fill the vacancy” in the event that an unaffiliated candidate
is elected to office.131 The court countered that the exact harm could
result with the inverse; if an unaffiliated person never joined a party
or a party’s nominee switched to unaffiliated, then no one could fill
the vacancy in that event.132 The court also rejected the Republicans’
argument that “because the only time the statutory provisions have
application is when a vacancy occurs, the plain meaning of ‘of the
122. Id. (emphasis added).
123. Wilson v. Sebelius, 72 P.3d 553, 555 (Kan. 2003).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-3903 (West 2016)).
127. Id. (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-3902(a) (West 2016)).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 554.
130. Id. at 556.
131. Id. at 559.
132. Id.
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party’ is the official’s party at the time of the vacancy.”133 Here, it
reasoned that “the legislature did not identify the time because it as-
sumed that the time would not be an issue . . . because it seems un-
likely that the legislature considered the possibility of an elected
official’s switching parties . . . .”134
Ultimately, the court concluded that the Democratic Party was enti-
tled to fill the vacancy due to overriding public policy concerns.135
Specifically, the court concluded that “the will of the electorate at the
preceding election [should] control[ ] which party fills the vacancy.”136
“It seems reasonable and logical to conclude,” it added, “that the leg-
islature did not intend that the outcome be different simply because
the individual officeholder changed party affiliation while in of-
fice.”137 Accordingly, “the statutory phrase, ‘of the party’ . . . mean[s]
the political party to which the officeholder belonged at the time of
the preceding election for that office.”138
4. West Virginia: State ex rel. Biafore v. Tomblin (2016)
The most recent state court to address this question was West Vir-
ginia’s Supreme Court of Appeals, as mentioned in Part I.139 Given
Part I’s discussion of Biafore, this Subsection need not regurgitate the
facts or the court’s holding in great detail. Instead, the purpose of dis-
cussing Biafore here is to contrast it with Herman, Richards, and Wil-
son, cases that the Biafore court considered.
The West Virginia statute provides that vacancies in the legislature
“shall be filled by appointment by the Governor, from a list of three
legally qualified persons submitted by the party executive committee of
the party with which the person holding the office immediately preced-
ing the vacancy was affiliated.”140 This language, the majority con-
cluded, was “clear and unambiguous.”141 “The legislature’s use of the
phrase ‘immediately preceding the vacancy’ is manifestly plain, enun-
ciating a specific and incontrovertible time criterion for the determi-
nation of the vacating officeholder’s party affiliation.”142 The court
rejected the analogies drawn by the Democratic Party to the Wyoming







139. See supra Part I.
140. State ex rel. Biafore v. Tomblin, 782 S.E.2d 223, 228 (W. Va. 2016) (quoting W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 3-10-5(a) (West 2020)).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 229.
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ards and Wilson are arguably laudable, this Court’s role is to apply the
language of our governing statute.”143
Justice Davis dissented, however, and accused the majority of ignor-
ing the statute’s ambiguity.144 She noted that, while the language cited
by the majority—that is, “the party with which the person holding the
office immediately preceding the vacancy was affiliated”—was cor-
rectly interpreted “as referring to the party that the outgoing legisla-
tor belonged to at the time he/she vacated his/her office,” the majority
ignored another provision of the same statute.145 She pointed out that
the statute required “‘the party executive committee of the state sena-
torial district in which the vacating senator resided at the time of his or
her election or appointment’ to supply the Governor with the list of
names. . . .”146 She argued that these inconsistent references to what
was, ostensibly, the same actor constituted “incongruous directives”
that made the statute “internally inconsistent.”147 Accordingly, she
concluded that the statute was unconstitutional under the West Vir-
ginia Constitution because it deprived the people of the state senato-
rial district of effective representation.148
5. Takeaways
The available caselaw is quite limited and, for the most part, yields
inconsistent interpretations of similarly worded statutes. For example,
the Kansas, Ohio, and West Virginia supreme courts reached different
interpretations of statutes worded quite similarly. In cases involving
party-switchers, despite working with similar concepts, each court
reached a different result. The Kansas Supreme Court in Wilson and
the Wyoming Supreme Court in Richards determined that the political
party “of which the officer . . . whose position has become vacant was
a member”149 and the “political party to which the member whose
office is vacant belonged,”150 respectively, referred to the party with
which the previous incumbent was elected.151 This result doesn’t nec-
essarily track with what we might expect about how the statute would
be interpreted,152 but it ultimately reflects a conscious decision by
each court to render a decision consistent with legislative intent.153
143. Id. at 230.
144. Id. at 240.
145. Id. at 240 (Davis, J., dissenting).
146. Id. (quoting W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-10-5(c) (West 2020)).
147. Id.
148. Id. (citing W. VA. CONST. art. II, § 2 (“The powers of government reside in all
the citizens of the state, and can be rightfully exercised only in accordance with their
will and appointment.”)).
149. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-3901(b) (2019).
150. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-524 (1999).
151. Wilson v. Sebelius, 72 P.3d 553, 559 (Kan. 2003); Richards v. Bd. of Cty.
Comm’rs, 6 P.3d 1251, 1253 (Wyo. 2000).
152. See supra Part III.A.1 (discussing Kansas statute).
153. See Wilson, 72 P.3d at 559; Richards, 6 P.3d at 1253.
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Meanwhile, the Ohio Supreme Court in Herman and the West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Biafore determined that the “po-
litical party with which the last occupant of the office was affiliated”154
and “the party with which the person holding the office immediately
preceding the vacancy was affiliated,”155 respectively, referred to the
party in which the previous incumbent was a member at the time of the
vacancy.156
These cases, therefore, represent a split of authority in answering
the ultimate question. Each of them dealt with an ambiguous statute
that was silent as to the temporal quality of party affiliation or mem-
bership. That is, each of them referred to the party with which the
previous incumbent was “a member,” “belonged,” or “was affiliated,”
but didn’t provide a meaningful measuring point for that association.
Though the statutes that the courts interpreted don’t always mirror
the statutes and constitutional provisions in force today,157 they none-
theless provide a meaningful body of caselaw in interpreting some of
these statutes. However, none of these four cases address the affilia-
tion or membership and the nomination or election distinctions identi-
fied earlier.158 The conclusions about those distinctions, therefore, are
untested.
IV. JUSTIFYING A “MOST RECENT ELECTION” BASED
REPLACEMENT MODEL
Having reviewed the current state of the law and speculated as to
how certain states answer the underlying question differently, this
Part argues for the adoption of a specific model—one in which same-
party replacements are determined on the basis of the last election,
154. State ex rel. Herman v. Klopfleisch, 651 N.E.2d 995, 996 (Ohio 1995) (quoting
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 733.08 (West 1997), amended by OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 733.08 (West 2016)).
155. State ex rel. Biafore v. Tomblin, 782 S.E.2d 223, 229–30 (W. Va. 2016) (quoting
W. VA. CODE § 3-10-5 (West 2018)).
156. Biafore, 782 S.E.2d at 229–30; Herman, 651 N.E.2d at 998.
157. For example, four years after the Wyoming Supreme Court’s decision in Rich-
ards, the Wyoming Legislature amended the statute to clarify that party membership
is determined by representation “at the time of” the official’s election. 2004 Wyo.
Legis. Serv. 22 (West, Westlaw through 2004 Sess.); see WYO. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-524
(West 2020) (referring to “the political party which the member whose office is vacant
represented at the time of his election”). Similarly, after the decision in Biafore, the
West Virginia Legislature amended the statute to affirm that party membership is
determined by party membership “at the time the vacancy occurred.” 2018 W. Va.
Acts 665; see W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-10-5(a) (West 2018) (referring to “the same
political party with which the person holding the office immediately preceding the
vacancy was affiliated at the time the vacancy occurred”). And as mentioned previ-
ously, the Ohio statute interpreted includes different language than the state constitu-
tional provision relating to legislative vacancies. Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 733.08 (West 1997), amended by OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 733.08 (West 2016), with
OHIO CONST. art. II, § 11.
158. See supra Part III.A.
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not on the vacating member’s most recent party affiliation. In so do-
ing, it proceeds in three parts: First, Section A outlines the basic prin-
ciples underlying same-party replacement schemes in the first place.
Second, Section B explains how the operation of same-party replace-
ments directly supports effective governance and maximizing voter
choice. Finally, Section C argues that these principles strongly support
clarification of the constitutional or statutory provisions at issue to
guarantee that party-switching shouldn’t preserve a party’s ill-gotten
gains.
A. The Principles
Same-party appointment schemes seek to guarantee accurate and
efficient representation for the voters in each legislative district.159 It
is often repeated that “people vote for an individual candidate and not
for a party,”160 but this statement is less an aphorism and more an
empirical claim not supported by the data. Party identification is “one
of the most important factors, if not the single most important factor,
in models of voting behavior in the American public.”161 Voters will
import their partisan preferences even into ostensibly nonpartisan
elections, which is strong support for the pervasiveness of partisan
voting.162 Moreover, ticket-splitting is rapidly declining,163 especially
in recent elections.164 As a result, it is simply inaccurate to say that
voters vote for the person any more than they vote for the person’s
party or ideology.165
Accordingly, same-party appointment schemes operate with this be-
havior in mind and do a better job of matching legislative representa-
tion to voter intent—that is, these schemes are better than special
elections at providing voters with accurate representation following a
vacancy. Special elections, the alternative procedure, feature low, un-
159. Yeargain, supra note 41, at 619–23. R
160. See, e.g., Op. Tenn. Att’y Gen. 81-163 (Mar. 13, 1981) (advising that a same-
party requirement for legislative appointments may be an unconstitutional addition to
legislators’ qualifications).
161. E.g., Chris W. Bonneau & Damon M. Cann, Party Identification and Vote
Choice in Partisan and Nonpartisan Elections, 37 POL. BEHAV. 43, 44 (2015).
162. Id. at 61–62.
163. BARRY C. BURDEN & DAVID C. KIMBALL, WHY AMERICANS SPLIT THEIR
TICKETS: CAMPAIGNS, COMPETITION, AND DIVIDED GOVERNMENT 163 (2002); David
C. Kimball, A Decline in Ticket Splitting and the Increasing Salience of Party Labels,
in MODELS OF VOTING IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: THE 2000 U.S. ELECTION 161,
161 (Herbert F. Weisberg & Clyde Wilcox eds., 2004).
164. E.g., Drew Desilver, Split-Ticket Districts, Once Common, Are Now Rare, PEW
RSCH. CTR. (Aug. 8, 2016), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/08/08/split-
ticket-districts-oncecommon-are-now-rare/ [https://perma.cc/T2YN-RFYD]; Geoffrey
Skelley, Split-Ticket Voting Hit a New Low in 2018 Senate and Governor Races,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Nov. 19, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/
split-ticket-voting-hit-a-new-low-in-2018-senate-andgovernor-races/ [https://perma.cc/
V4Q7-X9L7].
165. See Bonneau & Cann, supra note 161, at 44. R
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representative turnout and therefore frequently see results that are
inconsistent with the desires of the broader electorate. With that in
mind, it’s difficult to conclude that special elections are “democratic”
in the ways that matter most. Same-party replacements don’t suffer
from this infirmity. They instead base legislative representation on the
most important metrics of voter choice—party choice and ideol-
ogy166—as expressed by the broader electorate at the most recent
high-turnout election.
Moreover, these schemes maximize accurate and efficient represen-
tation. While special elections can take months to occur167—and even
then are sometimes delayed for more than a year—replacement
schemes waste little time in filling vacancies. In a state with special
elections, an untimely state legislative vacancy can leave a district en-
tirely unrepresented in one chamber of a legislature during an entire
legislative session. In short, same-party legislative appointment
schemes prevent both mis- and non-representations in all practical
senses.
But it is worth noting here that replacement schemes, by them-
selves, accomplish only the second goal: efficient representation. It is
the presence of the same-party requirement that accomplishes the
first. When a state lacks a same-party requirement in filling legislative
vacancies by appointment—as a handful of states do today—the prac-
tical result is a mismatch between voter intent and representation.168
Several early American examples, like Kentucky, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, and New Hampshire, which employed these schemes
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, are cautionary tales of
what can go wrong.169 In those states, legislatures filled vacancies
themselves and frequently engaged in machinations to cause vacancies
where they did not otherwise exist so that they could fill them and
further cement their power.170 The chief advantage of legislative ap-
166. See Seth Masket & Boris Shor, Primary Electorates vs. Party Elites: Who Are
the Polarizers? 11 (May 8, 2013) (unpublished article) (available at https://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2262076) (concluding that there is no ideo-
logical difference between elected and appointed legislators in Colorado and Illinois).
167. Most concerningly, special elections can delay effective representation even
when they are uncontested elections. For example, State Representative Dan Daley
won a special election to fill a vacancy in the Florida House by default when he was
the only candidate to file at the February filing deadline. But because the “election”
didn’t occur until June 18—despite the fact that, under Florida law, uncontested elec-
tions don’t appear on the ballot at all, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.151(7) (West 2020)—
Daley was not sworn in until June. Ryan Nicol, Dan Daley Ready to Be Seated Months
After Securing House Seat, FLA. POL. (June 18, 2019), https://floridapolitics.com/
archives/299094-daley-ready-seated-hd-97 [https://perma.cc/VB72-78AV]; see FLA.
CONST. art. III, § 15(d) (“Members of the legislature shall take office upon
election.”).
168. Yeargain, supra note 41, at 619–23. R
169. Tyler Yeargain, New England State Senates: Case Studies for Revisiting the In-
direct Election of Legislators, 19 U.N.H. L. REV. (forthcoming Spring 2021).
170. Id.
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pointment schemes—that is, ensuring as close a match between voter
intent and representation as possible—is not only nonexistent in such
states, but it is actively undermined.
B. The Operation
As explained, same-party replacement schemes preserve the status
quo between elections. Rather than forcing parties to defend their ma-
jorities at low-turnout special elections—which could determine con-
trol of the entire state government171—or endure a partial or total loss
of power following an untimely vacancy,172 they ultimately allow indi-
vidual legislators greater freedom in making individual choices.
A legislative majority shouldn’t depend on a single person continu-
ing to hold office. This produces perverse incentives for both parties
and politicians. Individual legislators may be strongly encouraged to
run for re-election, even when they would rather retire.173 Parties may
encourage lawmakers in ill health to remain in office despite medical
recommendations to the contrary so that the other party doesn’t get to
fill their seat174—or, at least, to time their resignations to avoid an
untimely special election.175
171. E.g., O’Sullivan, supra note 58 (discussing Washington state senate special R
election that determined control of the state government).
172. E.g., Vozzella, supra note 59 (discussing Virginia state senate vacancy that R
shifted control of the chamber to Republicans).
173. In Virginia, for example, Democratic State Senator Chuck Colgan, the then
longest-serving member of the Senate, was strongly encouraged to run for re-election
in 2011 by the state party following a cancer diagnosis to avoid the party losing the
seat. Rosalind S. Helderman, Colgan, Key Va. Senate Democrat, to Run Again in No-
vember, WASH. POST (May 31, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/virginia-
politics//colgan-key-va-senate-democrat-again-november/2011/05/31/_blog.html
[https://perma.cc/2VB4-TE7V]. “It is the third time party leaders have coaxed Colgan
into a reelection campaign—in 2003 and 2007 he had indicated that he would step
down, before being convinced to run again by Govs. Mark Warner and Tim Kaine.”
Id.
174. For example, shortly after Democrats won control of the U.S. Senate in the
2006 midterm elections, Senator Tim Johnson, a Democrat from South Dakota, suf-
fered a stroke. Kate Zernike, Ill Senator Is Called Responsive; Capital Is Riveted, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 15, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/15/washington/ [https://
perma.cc/AGP5-EKW6]. Had Johnson died or resigned prior to the expiration of his
term, he would have, in all likelihood, been replaced by a Republican. See id.
175. For example, the late Senator John McCain deliberately timed his resignation
to avoid a 2018 special election to fill his seat. Burgess Everett, GOP Hopes of Hold-
ing Senate Rise After Arizona Deadline, POLITICO (May 30, 2018, 4:28 PM), https://
www.politico.com//2018//30/arizona-senate-special-election-deadline-gop-614165
[https://perma.cc/H4H9-Q5S8]. Similarly, former Congressman Duncan Hunter
delayed his resignation following his indictment, likely to avoid a special election. See
Melanie Zanona, Rep. Duncan Hunter Resigns from Congress, POLITICO, https://
www.politico.com/news/2020/01/07/rep-duncan-hunter-resigns-from-congress-095
[https://perma.cc/U8AW-2WZM] (noting that Governor Gavin Newsom “does not
have to call a special election because the nomination period has closed and it’s an
election year, raising the prospect that the seat could remain vacant for the rest of
2020”).
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And perhaps more concerningly, the method by which a state will
fill its legislators’ seats frequently deters them from running for higher
office. U.S. Senator Sherrod Brown was considered as a potential run-
ning mate for Hillary Clinton in 2016 and as a potential presidential
candidate in 2020, but ultimately declined both opportunities—per-
haps in part because, if he vacated his seat, Ohio’s Republican Gover-
nor would have replaced him with a Republican.176 Bernie Sanders
and Elizabeth Warren faced similar problems but opted to run for
president anyway, perhaps comforted by the knowledge that though
their states are led by Republican Governors, Democrats have a
supermajority in each chamber and could require the governor to
make a same-party appointment.177
A similar type of fear may discourage governors from appointing
state legislators to their cabinets. Following their 2018 elections, Con-
necticut Governor Ned Lamont and Minnesota Governor Tim Walz,
both Democrats, appointed state legislators of their parties to their
cabinets.178 In both cases, subsequent special elections to fill the va-
cancies resulted in Republicans winning the seats.179 Though this may
have been of little concern to Lamont, where Connecticut Democrats
have a solid majority in the legislature,180 in Walz’s case, it meant that
Minnesota Republicans’ one-seat majority in the State Senate became
a two-seat majority, making it that much harder to win control of the
176. Eric Ostermeier, The Potential Pitfall of Selecting Sherrod Brown as Clinton’s
VP, SMART POL. (May 13, 2016), https://editions.lib.umn.edu/smartpolitics////the-po-
tential-pitfall-of-selecting-sherrod-brown-as-clintons-vp/ [https://perma.cc/RPP3-
XWJ4]; Andrew J. Tobias, So If Sherrod Brown Becomes President, Who Would Be
Ohio’s Next Senator? A Way-too-Early List of Candidates., CLEV.COM, https://
www.cleveland.com///11/a442bf5a981844/so-if-sherrod-brown-becomes-pr.html (last
updated Sept. 19, 2019) [https://perma.cc/5QUW-VH4R].
177. Geoffrey Skelley, How Winning the White House Could Cost Democrats the
Senate (at Least Temporarily), FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (May 22, 2019, 6:30 AM), https://
fivethirtyeight.com//-the-white-house-could-cost-democrats-the-senate-at-least-tem-
porarily/ [https://perma.cc/7MV6-WZ9S]; Stephen Wolf, How Democrats Can Avoid
Handing Senate Seats to the GOP If Warren or Sanders Win the Presidency, DAILY
KOS (Jan. 15, 2020, 12:11 PM), https://www.dailykos.com//1911306 [https://perma.cc/
EHW6-XYU2].
178. Christopher Magan, Tim Walz Announces New Cabinet Picks, Including State
Sen. Tony Lourey to Head Human Services, TWIN CITIES PIONEER PRESS, https://
www.twincities.com//01/03/tim-walz-tony-lourey-mn-human-services/ [https://
perma.cc/R8MQ-Z2M6]; Mark Pazniokas, Lamont Hiring Three Senators, Two House
Members, CONN. MIRROR (Jan. 7, 2019), https://ctmirror.org///07/lamont-hiring-three-
senators-two-house-members/ [https://perma.cc/5A9P-CB3B].
179. Peter Callaghan, The 2020 Fight to Control the Minnesota Senate Will Focus on
Just a Few Seats. And It’s Already Started., MINN. POST (Oct. 9, 2019), https://
www.minnpost.com/state-government/2019/10/the-2020-fight-to-control-the-minneso
ta-senate-will-focus-on-just-a-few-seats-and-its-already-started/ [https://perma.cc/
8HNY-HQF2]; Mark Pazniokas, GOP Flips Two Legislative Seats in Five Special
Elections, CONN. MIRROR (Feb. 26, 2019), https://ctmirror.org/2019/02/26/gop-flip-
two-legislative—five-special-elections/ [https://perma.cc/YW8E-V4T9].
180. Pazniokas, supra note 179 (“Even with the losses, Democrats retained solid R
majorities of 91–60 in the House and 22–14 in the Senate.”).
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chamber in 2020.181 Though the practical response to this may be that
governors should pragmatically avoid this sort of outcome by not ap-
pointing state legislators to their administrations,182 it seems bizarre to
argue that any governor should forego merit and competence183 out of
fear of what may happen in an unrepresentative and undemocratic
special election.184
Moreover, the presence of a same-party appointment requirement
is especially important in states where one party democratically and
legitimately wins large legislative majorities. In these states, because
the other party’s voters are at such a clear disadvantage, the legisla-
tors that they do manage to elect are that much more valuable to
them, and sometimes serve as the difference between the other party
having a veto-proof majority or a supermajority that can amend the
constitution with no support from the minority. For example, in 2002,
Democratic State Senator Dick Hagen died before the election but
was nevertheless re-elected.185 In 2003, Republican Governor Mike
Rounds appointed Michael LaPointe,186 who overwhelmingly lost re-
election, 69–31%, to Democrat Theresa Two Bulls in 2004.187 La-
Pointe’s loss is no surprise—the district that he represented included
Oglala Lakota County, which is home to the Pine Ridge Indian Reser-
vation and is the county in which Barack Obama received the highest
181. Callaghan, supra note 179. R
182. David Nir, Why Democratic Governors Shouldn’t Tap Democratic Legislators
in At-Risk Seats for Government Jobs, DAILY KOS (Feb. 6, 2019, 6:25 PM), https://
www.dailykos.com////6/1832854/-Why-Democratic-governors-shouldn-t-tap-Democra
tic-legislators-in-at-risk-seats-for-government-jobs [https://perma.cc/6VD2-HH3W].
183. Ironically, several months after Democrats lost the special election to replace
Tony Lourey in the Minnesota State Senate, Lourey resigned from his cabinet post.
Steve Karnowski, Minnesota’s Human Resources Chief Abruptly Quits Amid Turmoil,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 15, 2019), https://apnews.com/13fa3685b87949d491017
ceb08431b9e [https://perma.cc/4RC5-94TQ].
184. This concern also arises when vacancies are filled by means other than special
elections or same-party appointments. For example, in states where governors and
their next-in-lines are elected separately, the governors have a strong incentive to
remain in office when their next-in-line is a member of the opposing party. See, e.g.,
State of Fear, Editorial, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/
08/opinion/08mon2.html [https://perma.cc/AMG2-DB5V] (discussing that Arizona
Governor Janet Napolitano, a Democrat, would be succeeded by Republican Secre-
tary of State Jan Brewer after Napolitano was appointed by President Barack Obama
to be Secretary of Homeland Security).
185. Bob Mercer, Nelson Resignation Gives Governor a Sixth Vacancy in Legisla-




187. 2004 Legislature Official Returns, S.D. SEC’Y OF STATE, https://sdsos.gov/elec
tions-voting//election-history/2004/2004_legislature_official_Returns.aspx [https://
perma.cc/R3H2-ZXMS].
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percentage of the vote nationwide in 2012.188 It’s little surprise that in
South Dakota, which has the country’s longest streak of electing Re-
publican governors—it hasn’t elected a Democrat since 1974189—
Democratic legislators “joke amongst themselves ‘to drive safely, be-
cause remember, the governor has the power to appoint.’”190
This single mismatch—that is, an appointee whose ideology and
party affiliation are inconsistent with the district that she is appointed
to represent—results in more than just ideological mismatch. In
largely white, conservative states, a mismatch can also mean the depri-
vation of a racial minority’s ability to be represented by a “candi-
date[ ] of their choice.”191 Even though mismatches may not last more
than a year or two—though some states allow legislative appointees to
serve the remainder of the term, rather than just until the next elec-
tion—these mismatches are just another way, beyond the Electoral
College,192 national and state legislatures,193 and federal and state ju-
diciaries,194 that voters of color are underrepresented. While same-
188. Joshua Green, Guess Which U.S. County Most Loves Obama, BLOOMBERG
(Jan. 23, 2013, 3:06 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-01-23/guess-
which-u-dot-s-dot-county—obama [https://perma.cc/KD68-A6ET].
189. Eric Ostermeier, Can Billie Sutton End the Nation’s Longest Democratic Gu-
bernatorial Drought?, SMART POL. (Oct. 9, 2018), https://editions.lib.umn.edu///10/09/
can-billie-sutton-end-the-nations-longest-democratic-gubernatorial-drought/ [https://
perma.cc/9D7B-LEHL].
190. Tim Anderson, Midwest’s States Take Different Approaches to Filling Legisla-
tive Vacancies, COUNCIL OF ST. GOV’TS (Sept. 18, 2018, 12:16 PM), https://knowledge
center.csg.org//content/midwests-states-take-different-approaches-filling-legislative-
vacancies [https://perma.cc/QR6T-83Q3].
191. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 39–40 (1986) (noting that, in majority-
minority districts, one of the relevant metrics is determining whether the district’s
racial minority has the opportunity “to participate effectively in the political processes
and to elect candidates of their choice”). Some scholars have noted that “[t]his theory
only holds true, however, if the minority vote is monolithic; in other words, the stan-
dard works only in the absence of healthy competition and multiple viable minority-
preferred candidates.” Janai S. Nelson, White Challengers, Black Majorities: Recon-
ciling Competition in Majority-Minority Districts with the Promise of the Voting Rights
Act, 95 GEO. L.J. 1287, 1299 (2007).
192. See generally Matthew M. Hoffman, The Illegitimate President: Minority Vote
Dilution and the Electoral College, 105 YALE L.J. 935 (1996) (arguing that the Electo-
ral College deprives voters of color of the ability to elect candidates of their choice so
persistently as to be a Gingles violation).
193. See generally, e.g., David Leonhardt, Opinion, The Senate: Affirmative Action
for White People, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/14/
opinion/dc-puerto-rico-statehood-senate.html [https://perma.cc/WVM3-9VYP] (argu-
ing that voters of color are underrepresented in the U.S. Senate); Kim Soffen, How
Racial Gerrymandering Deprives Black People of Political Power, WASH. POST (June
9, 2016, 12:01 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news//wp//06/09/-widespread-
practice-to-politically-empower-african-americans-might-actually-harm-them/ [https://
perma.cc/EK6M-83HJ] (arguing that voters of color are underrepresented in Con-
gress and state legislatures because of gerrymandering).
194. Tracey E. George & Albert H. Yoon, The Gavel Gap: Who Sits in Judgment on
State Courts?, AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR L. & POL’Y 8–9 (2016), https://gavelgap.org/pdf/
gavel-gap-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/CGCG-D7KR]; Danielle Root et al., Building
a More Inclusive Federal Judiciary, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 3, 2019, 8:15 AM),
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party requirements don’t explicitly incorporate protections that ensure
that voters of color are represented by candidates of their choice,
most same-party replacement states incorporate local input in the se-
lection process195 such that concerns of a mismatch are likely to be
less pronounced.
C. The Argument
The argument in favor of filling legislative vacancies based on the
results of the most recent election, not based on the legislator’s most
recent partisan affiliation, is simple: Voters should get what they voted
for. Both party-switching and vacancies result in some degree of mis-
representation. Though party-switchers are far from doomed
electorally,196 they were elected into office with the support of people
who voted for them with the expectation that they were a member of
a particular party, and that they would support that party’s agenda.
Few voters, if any, vote for someone with the expectation that she will
switch parties. And regardless of how a state or territory chooses to
fill its vacancies, no one filling a vacancy will be identical to her
successor.
Given the mismatch inherent in the problem—even under the best
circumstances—the goal should be reducing the mismatch as much as
possible. Put another way, in a partisan election, voters are selecting
two things when they vote for a particular person: the individual per-
son and the person’s party.197 A vacancy occurring makes voters hav-
ing both of those things impossible—so if voters can’t have both, they
should at least have one. (And short of raising a deceased legislator
from the dead, or un-electing a state legislator from another office,
guaranteeing voters the same party is the only way to give voters one
of those two things.) When a legislator switches parties and then
leaves office, replacing her with a member of her new party would
frustrate expectations in more ways than one. If people voted for West
Virginia State Senate candidate Daniel Hall—a member of the Demo-
cratic Party who then switches to the Republican Party—it would
https://www.americanprogress.org//courts/reports//10/03/475359// [https://perma.cc/
5S87-AH4S]; see generally Alwyn Barr, The Impact of Race in Shaping Judicial Dis-
tricts, 1876–1907, 108 SW. HIST. Q. 423 (2005) (noting that state judicial districts were
deliberately drawn to prevent black representation in the South).
195. See Yeargain, supra note 41, at 604–08. R
196. It is the case, however, that party-switchers “fare worse in general elections
following their party switches when compared to elections before their switches and
when compared to incumbent non-switchers,” but that these “negative electoral out-
comes after a party switch are generally avoided when the legislator has defected to
the majority party.” Christian R. Grose, Is It Better to Join the Majority? The Electoral
Effects of Party Switching by Incumbent Southern State Legislators, 1972 to 2000, 25
AM. REV. POL. 79, 80 (2004).
197. As mentioned previously, the dominant political science literature suggests
that voters are much more strongly motivated by the candidate’s party than her indi-
vidual identity. See supra notes 161–65. R
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make little sense to fill Hall’s vacancy in a way that deprives voters of
both their choice of legislator (which, in the case of a vacancy, is inevi-
table) and their choice of party (which is far from inevitable).
Though the four state supreme courts to have addressed these ques-
tions have done so inconsistently, the statutory text, combined with
the available intent and the clear absurdity that would flow with a
contrary interpretation, would strongly support judicial determina-
tions that favor an election-based approach.
Turning first to the text of most of the statutes198—that is, the provi-
sions that refer to the “same party”—the text is plainly ambiguous.199
As this Article argued earlier, though most of the statutes or constitu-
tional provisions use the phrase “same party,” very few make clear
what the party is meant to be the “same” as.200 In the case of party-
switching, there are two viable options: the same party as the incum-
bent at the prior election or the same party as the incumbent at resig-
nation. There are viable arguments in support of either
interpretation—and so the provisions are ambiguous. With that deter-
mination in hand, we would ordinarily turn to gauging legislative
intent.201
Admittedly, the legislative history of legislative appointment
schemes does not reveal a specific intent to avoid this sort of outcome.
But the available intent, though thin, is strongly suggestive that these
schemes were adopted to ensure a seamless transition—both tempo-
rally and in terms of representation—following a vacancy.202 Idaho,
for example, adopted an appointment scheme in 1923 but lacked a
same-party requirement until 1971.203 Though the State’s governors
adopted an informal custom of making same-party appointments,
Governor Cecil D. Andrus advocated for the formalization of this cus-
tom, arguing that “accidents of death or resignation should not be al-
198. E.g., Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 172 (2001) (“We begin, as always, with
the language of the statute.”).
199. Wilson v. Sebelius, 72 P.3d 553, 556–59 (Kan. 2003) (finding the Kansas statute
ambiguous); Richard v. Bd of Cty. Comm’rs, 6 P.3d 1251, 1253 (Wyo. 2000) (“Finding
the statute does not address or anticipate the situation presented in this case, we hold
the statute is ambiguous.”); State ex rel. Herman v. Klopfleisch, 651 N.E.2d 995, 998
(Ohio 1995) (“Applying the usual, normal and customary meaning of ‘affiliated,’ it is
evident that [the statute] is ambiguous, in that it is unclear whether it refers to the
party which the ex-mayor was affiliated with at the time he was elected or at the time
he left office, and if it is the latter, what test to apply to determine party affiliation.”).
But see State ex rel. Biafore v. Tomblin, 782 S.E.2d 223, 228 (W. Va. 2016) (“Upon this
Court’s review, we find [the statute] clear and unambiguous.”).
200. See supra Part III.A.
201. E.g., United States v. Article of Drug Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 799 (1969)
(“[W]here the statute’s language seemed insufficiently precise, the ‘natural way’ to
draw the line ‘is in light of the statutory purpose.’”) (citation omitted).
202. See Yeargain, supra note 41, at 620–23. R
203. Id.
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lowed to thwart the political preferences of the electorate.”204
Similarly, at the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention in 1970, the
author of the constitutional amendment that eventually provided for
same-party appointments noted that the purpose was to “protect the
representation of that district and . . . protect the political party that
achieved the seat in the [last] election.”205 And, of course, the Su-
preme Court, in evaluating the constitutionality of Puerto Rico’s
same-party appointment statute, noted that the intent of the statute
was “to protect the mandate of the preceding election and to preserve
the ‘legislative balance’ until the next general election is held.”206 The
Court concluded that this interest in “continuity of party representa-
tion” was reasonable.207
But given the inconsistency with which courts have addressed these
questions, a constitutional or statutory solution that avoids this mis-
match is desirable. And in crafting such a solution, there are plenty of
good sources to choose from. The ideal scheme should pull from the
states that measure partisan affiliation by the most recent election,
like most states (seem to) do.208 Moreover, the scheme should also
recognize the unusual situations that can develop if someone was
elected as a write-in candidate or as an independent, but is practically
affiliated with a party209—it can pull from Alaska and Illinois in in-
cluding a legislator’s partisan membership in the first session in which
she served.210 And, most importantly, the scheme should either explic-
itly proscribe a procedure for filling a vacancy caused by a party-
switcher, as Arizona has done,211 or be phrased in a manner that
makes clear the procedure for filling such a vacancy.
This Article’s goal isn’t to proscribe a specific legislative appoint-
ment scheme—it instead recognizes that states have rightfully acted as
laboratories of democracy in developing different appointment proce-
dures with different appointing actors.212 Nonetheless, any scheme
should include a definition for “party” roughly tracking with Ari-
zona’s definition, for example:
204. H.R. Journal, 41st Legis. of Idaho, 1st Reg. Sess. 19 (1917) (statement of Gov.
Cecil D. Andrus).
205. 4 Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention, Verbatim
Transcripts: July 10, 1970 to August 5, 1970, 2667 (1970) [hereinafter Sixth Illinois
Constitutional Convention Proceedings].
206. Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1, 13 (1982).
207. Id.
208. See supra Part III.A.2.
209. See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text. R
210. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 15.40.330(b) (West 2020); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
§ 5/25-6(b) (West 2019).
211. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1202(C) (West 2018).
212. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (“It is one of the
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country.”).
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For the purposes of this section, “party” means the same political
party of which the person who was elected to or appointed to the
office was a member when the vacating officeholder was most re-
cently elected or appointed to that office. In the event that the va-
cating officeholder was elected as a write-in or unaffiliated
candidate, “party” means the same political party with which the
person who was elected to the office affiliated while a member of
the legislature, if any; if the vacating officeholder was not affiliated
with any such party, the [appointing actor] may fill the vacancy with
any otherwise-eligible candidate.
But given how rare both legislative vacancies and party-switching
are,213 much less the interaction between the two, why is this worth
addressing? First, it’s not clear exactly how often this phenomenon
occurs—though there are only a handful of cases in which this ques-
tion has presented itself, there are other instances of this question aris-
ing that ultimately did not result in litigation.214 Second, answering
these questions implicates far more than just state legislative vacan-
cies. As several of the cases discussed in this Article make clear, many
states apply same-party replacement requirements to other offices.
Though same-party requirements are most commonly imposed in fill-
ing state legislative vacancies, they are also imposed in some states for
filling vacancies for statewide elected officials,215 district attorneys,216
county officials,217 municipal officials,218 and—most controversially of
213. See supra Part II.B.
214. See, e.g., Jesse Paul, Rep. Steve Lebsock Became a Republican Minutes Before
Being Expelled from the Legislature, Meaning GOP Could Get His Seat, DENVER
POST, https://www.denverpost.com/2018/03/02/steve-lebsock-republican-colorado-leg
islature-expulsion/ [https://perma.cc/5RKK-JHJV] (noting that Colorado State Repre-
sentative Steve Lebsock, a Democrat, switched to the Republican Party shortly before
he was expelled from the State House, enabling the local Republican Party to replace
him).
215. MD. CONST. art. V, § 5 (attorney general vacancy); id. art. VI, § 1(c) (comp-
troller vacancy); UTAH CONST. art. VII, § 10(2) (vacancy in state auditor, state trea-
surer, or attorney general); IND. CODE ANN. § 3-13-4-3 (“vacancy that occurs in a
state office other than governor, lieutenant governor, or a judicial office”); OR. REV.
STAT. § 236.100 (“any partisan elective office in this state”); W. VA. CODE § 3-10-3(a)
(vacancy in secretary of state, auditor, treasurer, attorney general, and commissioner
of agriculture); WYO. STAT. § 22-18-111(a)(i) (“any state office other than the
governor”).
216. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 3-13-6-2(b); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-10-8.
217. E.g., 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/25-11 (county officers); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 3-13-7-1 (county officers); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-203 (county commissioner), 19-
303 (county clerk), 19-504 (county treasurer), 19-715 (county attorney), 19-804
(county sheriff), 19-1203 (county register of deeds); MD. CODE ANN. § 9-402(c);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-4-2106 (county commissioner); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 153A-27, 153A-27.1 (county commissioner); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 305.02
(“county commissioner, prosecuting attorney, county auditor, county treasurer, clerk
of the court of common pleas, sheriff, county recorder, county engineer, or coroner”);
W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 3-10-6 (circuit court clerk), 3-10-7 (county commissioner and
clerk of county commission), 3-10-8 (“sheriff, assessor or county surveyor”).
218. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 3-13-8-1 (“city office” other than city-court judge), 3-
13-9-1 (“town office”); 3-13-10-1 (“township office”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 733.08
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all—U.S. Senators.219 Though data is generally limited on the fre-
quency of party-switching at the local or county level,220 it certainly
happens. Accordingly, the legal questions presented by party-switch-
ing in states that employ same-party replacement schemes are likely
to present in other contexts, so answering this question correctly mat-
ters beyond the scope of legislative appointments.
But third, in any event, the unlikelihood of an event shouldn’t alter
the need to codify what happens if it does occur. For example, most
states have emergency-succession provisions that allow for the imme-
diate filling of vacancies if a mass casualty event occurs and a substan-
tial portion of the legislature is wiped out.221 The United States
Constitution allowed Congress to provide a procedure in the unlikely
event of a dual vacancy in the offices of President and Vice Presi-
dent,222 which Congress did shortly after the Constitution was rati-
fied.223 Some states have followed the federal government’s lead and
have similarly adopted procedures for filling dual vacancies in the of-
fices of Governor and Lieutenant Governor.224
More importantly, however, the resolution of this dual-vacancy
question has intrinsic value because of what it represents. Regardless
of our position on what the ideal outcome is, it’s obvious that there
should be one. Many state legislative chambers are governed by par-
ties with slim majorities.225 Though it’s rare for special elections or
(mayor). Because this Article is chiefly focused on state legislative vacancies, the
state-level examples identified in notes 216, 217, and 218, supra, of how the same- R
party requirement is applied to other offices are meant to be representative but not
exclusive.
219. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-222(C); HAW. REV. STAT. § 17-1; MD. CODE
ANN., ELEC. LAW § 8-6023(a); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-12; UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-1-
502(4)(a); WYO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-18-111(i).
220. E.g., Glaser, supra note 51, at 69 (“Hundreds of state and local officeholders R
also have [switched from the Democratic to Republican Party in the South], though it
is difficult to gauge exactly how many since such decentralized information is so hard
to come by.”).
221. Eric R. Daleo, State Constitutions and Legislative Continuity in a 9/11 World:
Surviving an “Enemy Attack”, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 919, 936–38 (2009).
222. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (“[T]he Congress may by Law provide for the
Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice
President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act
accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.”).
223. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 170 (2005).
224. E.g., MD. CONST. art. II, § 6 (“If vacancies in the offices of Governor and
Lieutenant Governor exist at the same time, the General Assembly shall convene
forthwith, and the office of Governor shall be filled for the remainder of the term by
the affirmative vote of a majority of all members of the General Assembly in joint
session.”); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 44.19.046 (West 2019) (“If vacancies in the office of
governor and the office of lieutenant governor occur simultaneously, the person ap-
pointed under [section] 44.19.040 succeeds directly to the office of acting governor
until successors to the respective offices are elected in a special election.”).
225. E.g., Post Election 2019 State & Legislative Partisan Composition, NAT’L
CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, https://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents//Legis_Control
__%20Nov%2022nd.pdf [https://perma.cc/ACF9-EH6B].
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party-switching to change control of a chamber,226 it has happened
frequently enough that states must have answers to these questions. In
the abstract, in a state like South Dakota or Wyoming, where Republi-
cans have virtually insurmountable legislative majorities,227 or in a
state like Maryland or Vermont, where the same is true of Demo-
crats,228 it may make little sense to agonize over how to replace a sin-
gle legislator. But for many of the other states that employ legislative
appointments, the chambers are more evenly divided.229 And even for
states with consistently large majorities for one party, one legislator
could be the difference between a veto-proof majority (or a
supermajority to amend the state’s constitution) or not.230
Finally, making a same-party appointment based on a legislator’s
registration or affiliation at the time of the vacancy creates perverse
incentives for legislators. In Colorado, for example, the Democratic
majority in the House of Representatives moved to expel Democratic
State Representative Steve Lebsock following serious sexual harass-
ment allegations.231 But right before the expulsion vote, Lebsock
switched parties and became a Republican, thereby enabling Republi-
cans to fill his seat.232 The Colorado Democratic Party considered fil-
ing a lawsuit to stop the vacancy from being filled with a Republican
appointee233 but ultimately didn’t. Getting legislative leaders to act to
226. See, e.g., Ralph Jimenez, With Election Defeat, N.H. Democrats Lose Majority
in Senate, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 9, 1999, at B19 (noting that a special election for the New
Hampshire State Senate resulted in Democrats losing control of the chamber);
O’Sullivan, supra note 58 (discussing Washington State Senate special election that R
determined control of the state government); Vozzella, supra note 59 (discussing Vir- R
ginia State Senate vacancy that shifted control of the chamber to Republicans).
227. For example, following the most recent elections, Republicans have a 30–5
majority in the South Dakota State Senate and a 59–11 majority in the State House,
and a 27–3 majority in the Wyoming State Senate and a 50–9 majority in the State
House. Post Election 2019 State & Legislative Partisan Composition, supra note 225. R
228. Democrats have a 32–15 majority in the Maryland State Senate and a 99–42
majority in the State House, and a 22–6–2 majority in the Vermont State Senate and a
95–43–12 majority in the State House. Id.
229. See Filling Legislative Vacancies, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, https://
www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/filling-legislative-vacancies.aspx
[https://perma.cc/66TN-LURY].
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expel members of their own party is difficult as it stands, but forcing
them to pay that sort of political price leaves open the possibility that
an unethical lawmaker could effectively blackmail her colleagues into
not expelling her by threatening to switch parties prior to her
expulsion.
Even putting those practical concerns aside, addressing this dual-
vacancy question matters for the simple fact that voters deserve accu-
rate representation. A single misrepresented voter—much less a sin-
gle misrepresented district—is deplorable in a democracy that seeks
to match voter intent to legislative representation.234 A legislator
switching parties and then creating a vacancy, even just once, presents
a problem worthy of a solution.235 This Article proposes one.
V. CONCLUSION
Half of the states in the United States—along with virtually every
territory—use some form of temporary appointments to fill legislative
vacancies. Though most of those systems require same-party appoint-
ments, few states have confronted an unlikely problem: What happens
when the vacancy is caused by a party-switcher? As this Article dem-
onstrates, this is a problem that warrants a solution. Drawing on the
principles underlying the adoption of same-party appointments in the
first place, this Article proposes the amendment of existing schemes in
a way that defines party membership or affiliation at the time of the
most recent election.
As the Supreme Court announced more than a century ago, the
right to vote is “a fundamental political right” because it is “preserva-
tive of all rights.”236 The right to vote carries consequences—and the
voters’ choice, as expressed at the most recent high-turnout election,
should have consequences in the realm of same-party legislative
appointments.
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